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his is a story that illustrates the interrelationship between economic his-
tory and economic thought: more precisely, between monetary history
and monetary thought. So let me begin with a very brief discussion of
the relevant history.
In 1879, the United States returned to the gold standard from which it had
departed at the time of the Civil War. This took place in a period in which
“a combination of events, including a slowing of the rate of increase of the
world’s stock of gold, the adoption of the gold standard by a widening circle
of countries, and a rapid increase in aggregate economic output, produced a
secular decline ˙ .. in the world price level measured in gold˙ ...” (Friedman and
Schwartz 1963, p. 91; for further details, see Friedman 1990, and Laidler 1991,
pp. 49–50). The speciﬁc situation thus generated in the United States was de-
scribed by Irving Fisher (1913c, p. 27) in the following words: “For a quarter of
a century—from 1873 to 1896—the dollar increased in purchasing power and
caused a prolonged depression of trade, culminating in the political upheaval
which led to the free silver campaign of 1896, when the remedy proposed was
worse than the disease.” This was, of course, the campaign which climaxed with
William J. Bryan’s famous “cross of gold” speech in the presidential election
of 1896. Fisher’s view of this campaign reﬂected the fact that it called for the
unlimited coinage of silver at a mint price far higher than its market value, a
policy that would have led to a tremendous increase in the quantity of money
and the consequent generation of strong inﬂationary pressures.
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Though Bryan was defeated in the subsequent election, his objective was
nevertheless accomplished by the unprecedented increase in the output of gold
that began in the 1890s as a result of the discovery of new gold deposits in
South Africa and Alaska, as well as the development of more efﬁcient processes
for the extraction of gold from the ore. Thus the world output of gold in 1899
was nearly three times the average annual output during the 1880s, and in 1905
it was nearly four times as large (Wright 1941, pp. 825–26). As a result, the
U.S. price level increased from 1896 to 1913 by almost 50 percent—a fact
duly noted and emphasized by Fisher (1913b, p. 217).1 It was this 40-year
experience of serious economic, political, and social problems generated by
signiﬁcant changes in the price level—in either direction—that led Fisher to
formulate his compensated dollar plan for stabilizing it.
Another important fact is that “guilt by association” with the declared
objective of the silver campaign to generate a great increase in the quantity of
money and hence in prices had caused the quantity theory itself to fall into dis-
repute. This situation was clearly reﬂected in Fisher’s statement in the preface
to his 1911 Purchasing Power of Money that “it would seem that even the the-
orems of Euclid would be challenged and doubted if they should be appealed
to by one political party as against another˙ ... The attempts by promoters of
unsound money to make an improper use of the quantity theory—as in the ﬁrst
Bryan campaign—led many sound money men to the utter repudiation of the
quantity theory.” In fact, that situation was the immediate reason for Fisher’s
writing the book; namely, that “the quantity theory needs to be reintroduced
into general knowledge” (ibid., p. viii).
Note ﬁnally that when in 1913 Fisher proposed his compensated dollar
plan, the Federal Reserve System had not yet come into existence. Though the
Act establishing it was approved toward the end of that year, the role that it
might play in stabilizing the price level did not become part of general thinking
about monetary policy until the 1920s. This delay was due in part to the fact
that in the ﬁrst years of the Federal Reserve System, its policy was more or
less dictated by the exigencies of World War I and, in part, to the time that
was naturally needed for the System to gain experience in the workings of
monetary policy (see Barger 1964, Chap. 3; Wicker 1966, pp. 57–58).
1 Fisher’s 50 percent ﬁgure was based on the wholesale price index which the Bureau of
Labor Statistics had begun to publish only in 1890. Consequently, for the period before that,
Fisher (in the statement cited in the preceding paragraph) had to sufﬁce with a general statement
about the increased purchasing power of the dollar. This is a minor illustration of another impor-
tant interrelationship: that between economic thought and economic measurement. For a much
more signiﬁcant illustration, see Patinkin (1976) for the interrelationship between macroeconomic
theory and measurement in the 1930s.        
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1. THE PLAN: RATIONALE AND DETAILS
With that as background, let me begin the story with Fisher’s already-mentioned
classic exposition of the quantity theory in his The Purchasing Power of Money.
That—or rather its inverse, the price level—is indeed the major concern of the
book. The book, however, also has a subtitle—Its Determination and Relation
to Credit Interest and Crises—and that is an almost equally important concern.
Though most of The Purchasing Power of Money (henceforth, PPM)i s
devoted to the long-run proportionality between the quantity of money and
the price level, Fisher attached great importance to Chapter 4 of the book on
“transition periods,” in which this proportionality did not obtain. And lest the
term “transition” mislead, let me point out that Fisher emphasizes that “periods
of transition are the rule and those of equilibrium the exception, [so that] the
mechanism of exchange is almost always in a dynamic rather than a static
condition” (ibid., p. 71).
It is accordingly in this chapter that Fisher develops his theory of “crises,”
or what we now call “cycles.” This was based on the fundamental distinction
that (with due acknowledgment to Alfred Marshall and even earlier writers)
he had already made in his 1896 Appreciation and Interest (Chaps. 1–3 and
12), and again in his 1907 Rate of Interest (Chap. 5 and its appendix), between
nominal and real rates of interest. Fisher begins his analysis of the period of
transition by assuming that the economy is in a state of equilibrium which is
disturbed, and adds that “any cause which disturbs equilibrium will sufﬁce to
set up oscillations. One of the most common of such causes is an increase in
the quantity of money” (PPM, p. 70). Accordingly, the “chief factor” that he
studies for this purpose is a change in the quantity of money (ibid., p. 55).
As a result of, say, an increase in this quantity, there follows an initial
increase in the price level, which in turn causes an increase in the velocity of
circulation, for “we all hasten to get rid of any commodity which, like ripe fruit,
is spoiling on our hands. Money is no exception; when it is depreciating, holders
will get rid of it as fast as possible” (ibid., p. 63). This causes a further increase
in the price level. As a result of the increasing price level, the nominal rate of
interest also increases. But—because of the failure of people to realize “that
they are daily gambling in changes in the value of money” (what in later writ-
ings Fisher denoted as “money illusion”), as well as of inadequate “knowledge
as to prospective price levels” on the part of lenders—“not sufﬁciently”; that is,
the nominal rate does not increase sufﬁciently to leave the real rate unchanged
(PPM, pp. 346, 321, and 63, respectively; see also Rate of Interest, p. 86).2
2 In his Theory of Interest (1930) many years later, Fisher attributed this insufﬁciency of
adjustment to the “almost universal lack of foresight” (ibid., pp. 43–44).      
4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Because of the consequent decline in the real rate of interest, businessmen’s
“proﬁts increase, loans expand, and the Q’s [i.e., outputs] increase” (PPM,
p. 63). This expansionary process continues until ultimately lending rates of
interest rise to correspond to the rate of inﬂation, which then causes difﬁcul-
ties for the business-borrowers “who have counted on renewing their loans at
the former rates,” hence to some bankruptcies, hence to “runs on the banks”
and a consequent decrease in bank credit and deposits, and hence in the
money supply—as a result of which pressure prices begin to decline (ibid.,
pp. 65–66).
The decline creates the opposite relationship between the nominal and real
rates of interest, this time as a result of the lack of knowledge on the part of
the borrowers. This increase in the real rate of interest generates a contrac-
tional process—which Fisher pedantically describes in the same step-by-step
sequence (with the signs reversed) that he had described in the expansionary
one (ibid., p. 69). Indeed, Fisher based his whole theory of the business cycle
on the miscalculations of the real rate of interest caused by a ﬂuctuating price
level: in the picturesque words with which he entitled one of his later articles
on the subject, “The Business Cycle Largely a ‘Dance of the Dollar’” (1923b).
(In a subsequent article on “Our Unstable Dollar and the So-Called Business
Cycle” [1925], Fisher also provided what he regarded as statistical veriﬁcation
of his theory.)3
From this analysis of the cycle there immediately followed Fisher’s pre-
scription for eliminating, or at least greatly mitigating, it: if the source of the
problem is the instability of the price level, then the solution to it is to stabilize
this level.4 Accordingly, Fisher devotes the concluding chapter of Purchasing
Power to a description and criticism of various proposals to accomplish this
purpose, and to the presentation of his own proposal. The following year,
he expanded on his proposal in an article in the December 1912 issue of
the Economic Journal. Shortly afterwards, in the February 1913 issue of the
Quarterly Journal of Economics, he presented a more detailed description in
an article entitled “A Compensated Dollar,” under which name his proposal
has since been known. And the only signiﬁcant difference between the “new
and revised” 1913 edition of Purchasing Power (henceforth, PPM–2) and the
original one is the addition of the appendix “Standardizing the Dollar,” in
3 In the history of econometrics, this article is notable for Fisher’s having introduced and
applied for this purpose the technique of the distributed lag, the term for which he then also
coined (see Alt 1942, p. 114, n. 4; see also Koyck 1954, pp. 30–32).
4 It is interesting to note that stabilization of the price level was the policy advocated by
many quantity theorists at the time (including Keynes of his quantity-theory period), though not
all for the same reason and/or by the same means. See Patinkin (1972) and Laidler (1991, Chaps.
3 and 5). See also the brief discussion of Wicksell on pp. 10–11 below.       
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which Fisher refers to his QJE article and spells out his proposal in greater
detail than in the original edition.5,6
In the appendix, Fisher considers it “easier to explain the principle of the
proposal” by considering the case in which all gold coin has been withdrawn
from circulation and replaced by gold certiﬁcates which can be redeemed upon
demand from the government for a certain quantity of gold bullion (PPM–2, p.
495). As an example of this aspect of his proposal, as well as to reassure his
reader that its like already existed in the world, Fisher referred to the similar
situation that existed under the gold exchange standard that was in operation
in India, the Philippines and in other countries (PPM and PPM–2, pp. 337–40;
1913b, pp. 226–27). Another way in which Fisher tried to present his plan in
familiar clothing was by relating it to “the ancient custom of seigniorage” and
to refer to it alternatively as “the adjustable seigniorage plan” (1913b, pp. 224,
395–96; see also PPM and PPM–2, pp. 330–1; PPM–2, pp. 498–99), in the
sense that his plan called for making adjustments in the amount of dollars that
one would receive for a given quantity of gold. In an accompanying footnote
(1913b, p. 224, n. 1), however, he admitted that for several reasons (including
the fact that it would not provide the government with revenue, which was of
course the historical purpose of seigniorage) it was a “peculiar sort of seignior-
age.” (A similar observation was subsequently made by B.M. Anderson [1913,
p. 42; see Section 3 below].)
Fisher then proceeds to explain that if an index of the price level should
increase by, say, 1 percent, then the purchasing power of a dollar gold-certiﬁcate
would be restored by increasing the “gold content” of a dollar by 1 percent;
and if during the following quarter that should not succeed in restoring the
original price level, the gold content would be further increased—and so forth.
Here, then, was a rule in the modern sense of the term (Fischer 1990, p. 1168).
Now, to increase the gold content of the dollar means to decrease the dollar
price of a given quantity of gold, and vice versa. Thus in the back of Fisher’s
mind when he formulated his proposal (and more or less explicitly in some of
his later discussions of it) there may have been the relation:
dollar price of basket of goods and services =
gold price of basket times dollar price of gold.
5 See the list of differences between the two editions on p. xii of the 1913 edition.
6 For other discussions of Fisher’s proposal, see Lawrence (1928, Chap. 7), Reeve (1943,
Chap. 11 et passim), and Dorfman (1959, vol. 4, pp. 288–93). It is also brieﬂy discussed in the
respective encyclopedia articles on Fisher by Allais (1968, p. 480) and Tobin (1987, p. 373b).
See also Fisher’s autobiographical account in his Stable Money (1934b, pp. 374–89), as well as
the chapters on “The Commodity Dollar” and “Money Illusion” in Irving N. Fisher’s biography
of his father (1956). See also the discussion in the recent biography by R.L. Allen (1993, pp.
162–67 et passim).       
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It would thus seem that any change in the gold price of the basket can be
offset by an appropriate change by the mint in the dollar price of gold, thereby
leaving the dollar price of the basket unchanged.
This relation, however, holds only in an economy in which not only dollars,
but physical quantities of gold (in, say, the form of blank gold slugs of a ﬁxed
weight, the dollar value of which is determined by the mint price of gold)
are part of the circulating medium of exchange, so that the gold price of a
basket accordingly means the number of gold slugs that have to be paid for
a basket. For then a, say, decrease in the mint price of gold, in order to offset
an increase in the dollar price of a basket, will in the ﬁrst instance (i.e., before
any subsequent change in that dollar price) decrease the dollar value of a gold
slug and hence (by “instant arbitrage” between paying in dollars and paying
in slugs) cause a proportionate increase in the slug price (i.e., the number of
slugs that have to be paid for a basket). But the decrease in the mint price
will also decrease the total quantity of money in the economy to an extent
determined by the proportion of this quantity that individuals choose to hold in
the form of slugs. And after the “ﬁrst instance,” this decrease will ultimately
(on crude-quantity-theory assumptions) generate an equiproportionate decline
in both the dollar and slug prices of a basket.7
On the other hand, the foregoing relation is obviously not relevant for the
pure form of Fisher’s plan in which only gold certiﬁcates are in circulation,
the dollar value of which is not affected by the change in the mint price of
gold. Nor would the situation be different if gold coins (the dollar value of
7 The following example illustrates this process. Assume for simplicity that individuals al-
ways hold half of their money balances in the form of dollars and half in the form of gold slugs
(evaluated at the mint price). Assume further that initially all prices in the foregoing relation are
unity. Denote this as Situation I. Let there now be an increase in the output of gold, hence a 10
percent increase in the money supply (which again is equally divided between dollars and slugs),
and hence a 10 percent increase in the price level (Situation II). In accordance with Fisher’s plan,
let the mint price be reduced by 9 percent so as to offset this price increase, but assume that in the
ﬁrst instance the dollar price of a basket remains unchanged; on the other hand, since the dollar
value of a slug has decreased, this means that the slug price has increased (Situation III). Since
gold slugs (evaluated at the mint price) constitute only half of the money supply, this 9 percent
reduction in their mint price causes a reduction of only 4.5 percent in the total money supply, and
hence ultimately a 4.5 percent reduction in both the dollar and slug prices of the basket (Situation
IV). These developments are described in the following table:
dollar price of basket = gold-slug price of basket times dollar price of gold
I 1.00 = 1.00 x 1.00
II 1.10 = 1.10 x 1.00
III 1.10 = 1.21 x 0.91
IV 1.05 = 1.155 x 0.91
Note that the 9 percent reduction in the mint price does not sufﬁce to restore the original dollar
price of a basket, but see next section on subsequent changes.
I am indebted to my colleague Tsvi Ophir for the construction of this example.       
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which would also not be affected) continued to circulate as well. For as Fisher
emphasized, the value of the gold actually contained in such coins generally
would be less than the nominal value of the coin itself, so that an anticipated,
say, decrease in the price index and hence increase in the mint price of gold
would not lead to the melting down of coins in order to obtain gold to sell to
the mint. In brief, “Gold dollars would, in such a system, be mere tokens—like
brass checks—entitling the holder to gold bullion” (1913b, p. 222).8
2. THE PLAN: CRITIQUE
Having brieﬂy indicated the nature of Fisher’s compensated-dollar proposal, let
me go on to say that it is a most puzzling one to have been advanced by the au-
thor of The Purchasing Power of Money. First of all, this book (as noted above)
regards changes in the quantity of money to be the major cause of changes in
the price level. We should accordingly expect that in any stabilization proposal
that Fisher would present, he would assign a primary role to the quantity of
money. I do not mean that we should expect him to have advocated the policy
of, say, the Chicago School 20 years later to stabilize the price level by making
offsetting changes in this quantity (see Patinkin 1969, pp. 245-46), for there
was as yet no institutional framework in the United States that would have
enabled using the quantity of money as a policy variable. In particular, there
was as yet no central bank; nor was it part of generally accepted thinking at
that time to generate peacetime changes in the quantity of money by having the
government deliberately incur budgetary deﬁcits or surpluses. But we should at
least have expected Fisher to have emphasized and clearly explained the way
in which his proposal would generate the necessary offsetting changes in the
quantity of money and hence in the price level. Of this, there are only passing
remarks in the appendix that Fisher added to the second edition of his book
and in his 1913 QJE article.
Second, not only did Fisher not associate his plan with the quantity theory
of money, but his presentation of it smacks of the commodity theory of money:
the theory that claims that the value of money is determined by the value of the
gold which it contains or for which it can be redeemed, and accordingly the
theory which is the antithesis of the quantity theory that Fisher was forcefully
advocating. In the words of B.M. Anderson, one of its leading advocates at the
8 Fisher was fully aware of the danger that anticipated changes in the price of gold in
accordance with his plan could encourage speculative purchases or sales of gold to the mint that
would generate losses for the government. In order to prevent such speculation, he stipulated that
there be a difference between the mint buying and selling price (which difference he denoted as
a “brassage” charge) and that any change in the mint price of gold as a result of a change in the
price index be less than this difference (1913b, pp. 227, 385–88).        
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time, the commodity theory contends “that by putting more bullion behind the
coin you can ipso facto raise the value of the dollar” (1913, p. 42).9
Third, even Fisher’s aforementioned passing remarks on the quantity of
money refer only to the changing amounts of money (i.e., gold certiﬁcates)
that miners would receive when they sold new gold to the mint, and that
“jewelers and others who desire gold bullion” would have to pay when they
bought gold from it (1913b, pp. 222–23; see also PPM and PPM–2, p. 343).
But Fisher’s argument in Purchasing Power is that it is the stock of monetary
gold that inﬂuences the price level, not the ﬂows into or out of it. In fact,
he distinguishes sharply between these two concepts, and even illustrates this
distinction with one of his ingenious and complicated diagrams (PPM and
PPM–2, p. 105). These ﬂows are, to begin with, small relative to the stock.
Furthermore, even they would be affected only to a minor extent; namely, to
an extent determined by the elasticity of supply of the gold mines, and the
elasticity of demand of the arts, with respect to small percentage changes in
the price of gold. Thus changes in that price cannot be expected to exert any
signiﬁcant short-run inﬂuence on the price level.
Fourth, in his exposition of the quantity theory in terms of his famous
equation of exchange
MV + MV = PT,
it is the total quantity of money, currency (M) plus demand deposits (M)—
what we today denote as M1—that matters. But the compensated dollar plan
directly affects only M. Now, it is true that in his Purchasing Power, Fisher
assumed that “deposits are normally a more or less deﬁnite multiple” of M
(PPM and PPM–2, p. 50, italics added; see also pp. 53–54). But in periods
of transition—which, as we recall, “are the rule,” and which surely are the
periods for which his plan was designed—the ratio of M to M changes (ibid.,
p. 61). It is, however, also true that Fisher assumed that this change reinforces
the effect of the change in M: that, say, a price rise generated by an increase
in the quantity of money also “increases the ratio of M to M” (ibid.). Still, it
is puzzling that he completely disregarded the role of demand deposits.
Fifth, Fisher does not indicate that, under the gold standard that then
prevailed, changing the dollar price of gold in accordance with his proposal
meant changing the foreign exchange rate. At the same time, he was in favor
of ﬁxed exchange rates in order to avoid “again restoring the uncertainties
9 Anderson’s full statement is cited below. In order to avoid possible misunderstanding, let
me emphasize that the long-run implications of the quantity theory, on the one hand, and of the
commodity theory, on the other, are the same in the sense that both imply that the marginal cost
of producing gold equals its mint price. But whereas the quantity theory explains that this equality
is achieved over a period of time during which, say, an increase in the quantity of money raises
prices and hence this marginal cost until it equals the mint price of gold (i.e., until equilibrium
is achieved), the commodity theory contends that this equality always obtains.        
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of international exchange” (PPM and PPM–2, p. 340). And in an amazing
statement, he declared in his 1913 QJE article that his plan did not involve
“abandoning the gold standard” (ibid., p. 221), for “it is the possibility of turning
gold dollars or gold certiﬁcates into commercial bullion which is the essence
of the gold standard” (ibid., p. 223, n. 1)—as if the price at which this was
done, and hence the exchange rate thereby determined, was of no consequence.
In all fairness, however, I must note that there is one discussion in Purchasing
Power (pp. 341–43) which might be interpreted as advocating the adoption of
the compensated dollar proposal by all gold-standard countries of the world in
a way which would leave their exchange rates unchanged. On the other hand,
though the numerical illustration of the operation of the plan in Appendix II
of the 1913 QJE article (here described as “the adjustable seigniorage plan”)
is based on the assumption that it is adopted only in the United States (ibid.,
p. 394), there is no indication in it of the consequent effect on the exchange
rate. In Appendix III to the article, however, there is a brief consideration of
the case in which all countries adopt the proposal (ibid., p. 396).10
There is, however, a simple answer to most of the above puzzles; namely,
that the person who is our present concern is not Irving Fisher the author of
the scientiﬁc work on The Purchasing Power of Money, but Irving Fisher the
deviser of a plan to be “sold” to the economics profession as well as to the
business community and government—and to be “packaged” accordingly. The
quantity theory of money was out of favor in some circles, so the plan should
not be explicitly associated with it. The commodity theory of money had in-
ﬂuential supporters, so the plan should be presented in language that had the
sounds of that theory. The gold standard was sacred, so it should be emphasized
that the plan did not involve its abandonment.
3. THE RECEPTION BY THE PROFESSION
The foregoing criticisms of Fisher’s plan are not new. Indeed, most of them
were raised immediately after its publication, though they did not deter Fisher
from persisting in advocating the plan for many years to come. Thus in the issue
of the QJE following the one with Fisher’s article, Frank Taussig (1913)—the
doyen of American economists—published a critique of Fisher’s plan in which
he said:
More stress should be laid, however, than Professor Fisher does, on
the fact that the plan can work out its results only through its effects on
10 I should note that Allais (1968, p. 480) presents a more favorable view of Fisher’s plan
in a long-run context. He claims that if it had been in operation during the nineteenth century,
then “the long-run increases and declines in the price level, which actually occurred and whose
drawbacks are evident, could have been avoided.” Fisher, however, regarded his plan as one that
would deal with short-run problems as well.     
10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
the quantity of coined gold ˙ ... The consequences on prices [of an increase
in the gold content of the dollar] will be precisely the same as those of di-
minished production or limited coinage. Professor Fisher seems to expect a
closer connection. His analysis implies, almost states in terms, that prices will
accommodate themselves at once or very promptly to the bullion equivalent
of the coined dollar; that as the bullion required for the dollar increases, prices
will fall quasi-automatically in proportion; and that as the bullion equivalent
lessens, prices will be correspondingly affected at once. Now, no one has stated
more clearly and explicitly than Professor Fisher himself, in his Purchasing
Power of Money, the grounds for maintaining that the connection between the
bullion equivalent in the coined dollar and prices will work out its effects
solely through changes in quantity. He has shown that the connection between
the quantity of coined money and general prices is by no means a close one.
It is not only loose and uncertain, but we are much in the dark concerning
the degree of looseness and uncertainty. Economists should be very chary of
prediction in such matters, and Professor Fisher makes predictions which the
event might greatly falsify. (1913, pp. 402–3; italics in original)
As might be expected from an economist with a primary interest in interna-
tional trade theory and policy, Taussig (1913, pp. 410–11) also pointed out the
effect of Fisher’s plan on the exchange rate. He stressed that while that effect
would be immediate, the effect on domestic prices would at best take place
with a lag. Thus if in the face of an inﬂationary process the gold content of the
dollar were increased—which would mean that the dollar appreciated in the
foreign exchanges—the receipts of exporters would immediately be affected
adversely, while their domestic costs of production would decline only after
a lag. Exporters would then put pressure on Congress and the government to
abandon the policy. Furthermore, Taussig left no doubt about his opinion that
an “international agreement” for the adoption of the compensated dollar plan–
which would have the beneﬁt of obviating the need for changes in the exchange
rate–seemed to him “in the highest degree unlikely” (ibid., p. 407).
In light of these as well as other objections, Taussig concluded, “On the
whole, I conclude that this proposal for radical change gives better opportunity
for ingenious intellectual exercise than for practical efﬁcacy” (ibid., p. 416).
Interestingly enough, Fisher’s Quarterly Journal of Economics article also
evoked a critical reaction from Knut Wicksell. In a note entitled “Another
Method of Regulating the Value of Money” which he submitted in 1913 to that
journal, Wicksell began with a criticism of Fisher’s plan on the grounds that
although of course the method proposed by professor Fisher always must be
regarded as a step in the right direction, it will generally prove to be too small
a step to have immediately any practical bearing at all on the level of prices.
Fisher forgets, it seems to me, that an alteration of the mint price will directly
inﬂuence only the new gold, and as the gold produced every year is only a
small fraction of the whole amount of gold and hence of the volume of money,         
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the possible alteration of the value of money and of the level of prices will at
ﬁrst only be a fraction of a fraction or practically nil. (emphasis in original)
As an alternative to Fisher’s plan, Wicksell then went on to spell out the details
of the policy that he had advocated in his 1898 Geldzins und G¨ uterpreise11 and
in his 1907 Economic Journal article on “The Inﬂuence of the Rate of Interest
on Prices” to stabilize the price level by means of central-bank interest-rate
policy. In a very polite and respectful letter of rejection to Wicksell dated
January 7, 1914, however, Taussig (then editor of the QJE) did not refer to
Wicksell’s criticism of the plan, but simply explained that since Wicksell’s pol-
icy proposal was familiar to American economists from his two aforementioned
publications, he (Taussig) had reluctantly concluded that the journal could not
publish the note.12
Fisher also presented his plan at the 1912 Meetings of the American Eco-
nomic Association. And here the sounds of the commodity theory of money
are unmistakable:
Both on the basis of theory and of facts, we may accept as sound the
principle that the lighter the gold dollar the less its purchasing power and the
more magniﬁed the scale of prices; and that the heavier the dollar the greater
its purchasing power and the more contracted the scale of prices. Evidently
if we can ﬁnd some way to increase the weight of the dollar just fast enough
to compensate for the loss in the purchasing power of each grain of gold, we
shall have a fully “compensated dollar,” that is, a dollar which has constantly
restored to it any purchasing power it may lose by gold depreciation. (1913c,
pp. 20–21)
Again, the value of a gold coin “would be determined just as the value of a
gold certiﬁcate or any other paper money is today determined, by the ultimate
bullion with which it would be interconvertible” (1913c, p. 24).
In any event, one Albert C. Whitaker (1913, pp. 31–32) began his discus-
sion of the paper with the statement that “at one place in his paper Professor
Fisher has followed the instincts of a good propagandist and has invited even
11 See pp. 189–92 of the 1936 translation of this book under the title Interest and Prices.
12 I am indebted to Lars Jonung for providing me with a copy of Wicksell’s note, as well
as of Taussig’s reply, and granting me permission to cite from them here.
In a comment on this paragraph, David Laidler has pointed out to me that the English
version of Wicksell’s Lectures on Political Economy, Vol. II: Money (which was translated from
the third [1929] edition of the Swedish original) contains a “Note on Irving Fisher’s Proposal
for the Regulation of the Purchasing Power of Money” (ibid., pp. 225–28). An attached editorial
footnote explains that this “Note” was added by Wicksell to the second (1915) Swedish edition,
and that Wicksell had indicated in the preface to that edition that it constituted a brief resume of
a 1913 paper which he had published in Ekonomisk Tidskrift. The title of that paper was similar
to the one he submitted to the QJE, and so I presume that its contents were also similar. In any
event, the “Note” in the English translation contains the same criticism of Fisher’s plan cited
here–including the same emphasis on “fraction of a fraction.”        
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those who repudiate the quantity theory to join with him in support of the
adjustable seigniorage plan”13 and then went on to emphasize that “it is clear
the author of the plan himself conceives it simply as one which will provide for
an approximate stability in the purchasing power of the money unit merely by
way of and through its effects upon the quantity of standard coin in circulation”
(italics in original).
At the same time, Whitaker questioned the practicality of the plan because
he
[did] not at all follow Professor Fisher in his assumption that the amount of
change of seigniorage [i.e., in the gold content of the dollar] required to correct
a given change in the price level can be clerically or ministerially determined,
or even approximately so determined. (ibid., p. 32; italics in original)
And again:
I may be wrong, but I think the assumed substantial proportionality between
seigniorage change and consequent price level change (or correction), would
be likely to prove so far away from what we should actually experience as to
suggest strongly the abandonment of the ministerial or clerical determination
of the seigniorage. (ibid., p. 34)
With these last two comments, another discussant, O.M.W. Sprague (1913, p.
40), who played an important role in the discussions that led up to the Federal
Reserve Act (Warburg 1930, vol. 1, pp. 35–6; Friedman and Schwartz 1963,
pp. 410–11), expressed his agreement.
Whitaker also pointed out that, in order to avoid ﬂuctuations in the ex-
change rate,
the only method to be recommended for putting Professor Fisher’s general
plan for an adjustable seigniorage into effect, would be to have an international
agreement between the leading nations providing for equal and simultaneous
alterations of the seigniorage charge in all, determined upon the basis of a
world’s index number. (ibid., p. 35)
Of particular interest is the comment of a then leading exponent of the
commodity theory of money, B.M. Anderson (1913, p. 42), part of which I
have cited above:
Because I am not a quantity theorist, I am disposed to believe that Pro-
fessor Irving Fisher’s plan of stabilizing the dollar might be feasible. If he
put it on a quantity theory basis, and tried to raise the value of the dollar
by charging a real seigniorage, and so checking the increase in the number
of dollars, I should be very skeptical. But his plan is not a real seigniorage
13 No such statement appears in the published version of Fisher’s paper. Presumably, how-
ever, he did make it in his oral presentation. In any event, he did make it in some of his later
writings (see below).        
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plan. The coined dollar is interconvertible with the gold bullion, and you can
always get your bullion back. I believe that by putting more bullion behind
the coin you can ipso facto raise the value of the dollar, and consequently
lower the level of prices. But I do not see how, on the basis of the quantity
theory, you could be sure of getting any deﬁnite result by Professor Fisher’s
plan. (ibid., italics in original)
Another discussant was E.W. Kemmerer (1913, p. 45), a staunch advocate
of the gold standard, who accordingly opposed the plan on the grounds that “its
adoption would demoralize the international exchanges.” He also described as
“visionary” the “hope of securing a comprehensive international agreement on
this scheme” and thereby enabling the plan to operate without causing changes
in exchange rates.
In his reply to his critics, Fisher (1913d) agreed with Kemmerer’s statement
about the effect on the exchange rates, and said that “for this reason I should
not advocate the plan for one nation alone, but should advocate it only under
international agreement” (ibid., p. 48). But in the paragraph following that state-
ment, Fisher explained to another of his critics that one of the ways in which
a reduction in the price of gold would “tend to contract the currency” would
be by “diverting gold ˙ .. to countries where the price had not been changed”—a
diversion which would take place only with respect to countries that were not
part of an “international agreement” and with respect to which the dollar would
accordingly appreciate.14 Nor did he address the basic question that had been
raised by both Whitaker and Anderson as to the questionable quantitative effect
that changing the gold content of the dollar would have on the total stock of
money, as distinct from its effect on the inﬂow and outﬂow of gold into this
stock.
During 1913 there appeared many other articles on Fisher’s plan by both
American and European economists. In one of them, David Kinley (1913, pp.
9–10, 16–17), an inﬂuential monetary economist of the period (see Dorfman
1959, vol. 4, p. 313 n.) in effect pointed out that Fisher’s proposal would change
only the quantity of currency in circulation, whereas the price level also de-
pended on the quantity of demand deposits as determined by the volume of
bank credit—and in this context rejected Fisher’s assumption of a constant ratio
14 Further evidence on Fisher’s ambivalent treatment of this issue is provided by the follow-
ing footnote in a 1913 article objecting to his plan by one E.M. Patterson:
[Fisher’s] ready admission of the serious effect on foreign trade is surprising. In
reply to the question, “Would not the adoption of the plan by the United States alone
play havoc with our foreign trade?” he answers “Yes, most certainly. Foreign exchange
would become uncertain and variable. While the plan could be worked if adopted by
one nation without the concurrence of others, its beneﬁts would be best secured through
its adoption by a number of nations.” The New York Times, December 22, 1912. (ibid.,
p. 869, n. 14)        
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between the two.15 J.M. Clark (1913) wrote that the plan was an improvement
over the gold standard, but pointed out possible complications.
Fisher’s reaction to these articles was presented in his “Objections to a
Compensated Dollar Answered” (1914), which included a selected bibliogra-
phy of the literature that had grown up about his plan. In his article Fisher
intensiﬁed his effort to sell his plan by means of arguments which made it all
things to all men (ibid., pp. 820–22).
Thus it was not true that “the plan assumes the truth of the quantity theory
of money.... On the contrary, the plan will seem simpler, I think, to those
who believe a direct relationship exists between the purchasing power of the
dollar and the bullion from which it is made—without any intermediation of the
quantity of money—than it will seem to quantity theorists”—and here Fisher
cites B.M. Anderson’s aforementioned statement at the 1912 meetings of the
American Economic Association. On the other hand, it was not true that “it
contradicts the quantity theory” for, say, “an increase in the weight of the virtual
dollar, i.e., a reduction in the price of gold bullion, would tend to contract the
currency, by diverting gold from the mint into the arts ˙ ... A decrease, of course,
would have the opposite effect.”
There was no reason to fear that “the correction of the price level would
be too sudden,” for
all adjustments require time. Changes of the ﬂow of gold into or out of cir-
culation are like changes in a mill pond from the sluice gates. The pond
does not jump its level down or up every time the gate is opened or closed.
The change of level begins immediately but it is not completed immediately.
(italics in original)
On the other hand, there was no reason to fear that “the correction of the price
level would be too slow”:
How prompt the effect would actually be, we have no exact means of knowing.
I should expect an appreciable effect within a week. One can scarcely deny
that the effect would begin at once, for the instant that the price of gold is
decreased, even a little, there would be at least some tendency to increase the
use of gold in the arts and, consequently, an immediate reduction in the amount
of gold taken to the government for money. If this be conceded, the plan would
surely, under any conceivable circumstances, have a great and quick inﬂuence
toward stability. (ﬁrst and last set of italics in this passage added)
Fisher then proceeded to support his plan with misleading examples. “The
closure of the Indian mints in 189316 had an almost immediate inﬂuence in
raising the value of the rupee”—as if a valid inference could be drawn from
15 Actually, as noted above, Fisher did not maintain this assumption for “periods of transition”
(PPM and PPM–2, p. 55).
16 For details, see Nambudiripad (1955), pp. 57 ff.     
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a situation in which there was a complete stoppage of the sales of bullion to
the mint in exchange for new coinage, to a situation in which net sales to the
mint were slightly reduced as a result of the decrease in the output of gold
and increased diversion into the arts caused by a decline of 1 percent in the
mint price. “The rate of exchange on London in New York has often changed
from the maximum to the minimum inside of a fortnight”—as if the arbitrage
that rapidly adjusted exchange rates between those two gold-standard countries
by shifting amounts of gold from an existing monetary stock of gold from the
market for dollars to that for sterling (or vice versa) is of any relevance for
the speed of adjustment of the price level involved in the compensated dollar
plan—which depends on a change in the level of the stock (see p. 8 above).
4. THE HIGH POINT OF THE COMPENSATED DOLLAR
In his 1914 article (p. 818), as well as in the appendix that he had added
to the revised edition of Purchasing Power of Money (1913a, p. 494), Fisher
referred to a book that he hoped shortly to publish about his plan. So let me
skip the many additional discussions of his plan in the immediately following
years and turn to the book in question. This ﬁnally appeared in 1920 under the
title Stabilizing the Dollar and is the most systematic and detailed presentation
of the compensated dollar proposal. Here again we ﬁnd statements that sound
more like those of a commodity theorist than a quantity theorist, such as the
following example:
I do not think that any sane man, whether or not he accepts the theory of
money which I accept,* will deny that the weight of gold in a dollar has a
great deal to do with its purchasing power. More gold will buy more goods.
Therefore, more gold than 23.22 grains will, barring counteracting causes,
buy more goods than 23.22 grains will buy. Therefore if the dollar, instead
of being 23.22 grains, or about one-twentieth of an ounce of gold, were an
ounce or a pound or a ton of gold, it would, other things equal, surely buy
more than it does now, which is the same thing as saying that the price level
would be lower than it is now.
A Mexican gold dollar weighs about half as much as ours and therefore
has less purchasing power. If Mexico should adopt the same dollar that we
have, no one could doubt that its purchasing power would rise about twofold,
that is, the price level in Mexico would fall about half. Likewise, if we should
adopt the Mexican dollar, our prices would about double.
*Thus B.M. Anderson, Jr., probably the ablest writer among the few who still
dissent from the “quantity theory” in any form, nevertheless approves of the
proposal to stabilize the value of a dollar by adjusting its weight.
(ibid., p. 90)
Note, too, the misleading nature of the argument in the second paragraph: for
the changes in the price level there described are not the short-run ones that   
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Fisher claimed for his plan, but the long-run changes associated with the new
equilibrium that would be established after the monetary stock of gold (and
hence the quantity of money) had been slowly and fully adjusted to the change
in the gold content of the dollar in question—including the adjustment generated
by the specie-ﬂow mechanism activated by the change in the exchange rate.
In this book, Fisher (ibid., pp. 87–96) again emphasized that his plan did
not involve the abandonment of the gold standard. Under the heading “The
Essentials of a Gold Standard,” he justiﬁed this statement on the grounds that
the mint would continue to buy and sell gold in exchange for gold certiﬁcates,
which he termed “yellowbacks”—presumably to distinguish them from the
famous greenbacks, which could not be redeemed for gold. In this context, he
also mentioned importers and exporters as buyers and sellers, respectively, of
gold. But he did not point out that his plan, based as it was on a varying price
of gold, meant (in basic contrast with the gold standard as it then operated)
that the exchange rates at which they carried out their international transactions
would also vary. This fact was, however, pointed out in an appendix to the book
on “Technical Details,” but with practically no indication of the difﬁculties for
international trade that this would generate, and only with the expression of
the hope and anticipation that the plan would be adopted by other countries as
well (ibid., pp. 172–82; see also p. 235, sec. D).
In another appendix to the book (ibid., pp. 214–51), Fisher repeated his
presentation of the plan as one that could be supported whether or not one
believed in the quantity theory, and also discussed criticisms that had been
levied against the plan. Though he did not explicitly refer to the one about
the slowness with which the plan would affect prices, he did make a major
modiﬁcation in it which could increase this speed. In particular, Fisher added
the possibility of adopting a “deﬁnite–reserve system” in which any change
in the price of gold also revalued the existing monetary stock of gold with a
consequent change in the quantity of gold certiﬁcates that could be issued. This
was contrasted with the “indeﬁnite-reserve system,” which is how he termed
the system he had until then advocated. In Fisher’s words:
Under the “indeﬁnite-reserve” system the only inﬂow and outﬂow of
[gold] certiﬁcates would be through the deposit and withdrawal of gold, just
as at present; whereas under the “deﬁnite-reserve” system there would be,
in addition, an inﬂow and outﬂow of certiﬁcates through special issues or
cancellations to keep the total outstanding volume of certiﬁcates in tune with
the gold reserve ˙ ...
The “deﬁnite” system would act more promptly to stabilize the price
level than would the “indeﬁnite,” because, for one reason, the change in the
circulation would be more prompt. The instant any change in the dollar’s
weight is made there is a change in the number of dollars of the reserve, and
the volume of certiﬁcates is readjusted to this changed reserve immediately.
Under the “indeﬁnite” system, on the other hand, the circulation would be
affected somewhat more slowly and only as the ﬂow of gold deposits and
withdrawals became changed. (ibid., pp. 129–31)        
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Signiﬁcantly enough, however, Fisher does not explain the mechanism by which
“the volume of certiﬁcates [in circulation] is readjusted.” Furthermore, in view
of the smallness of the ﬂows relative to the stock of gold, surely the term “more
slowly” grossly understates the difference in speed at which these two systems
would operate.
There are also three minor and somewhat piquant points about the book
that I would like to mention. First, Fisher rhetorically asked, “Why did not
our civilization improve [i.e., standardize] its monetary units years ago, as it
improved all other units? Why was so simple an idea overlooked or ignored?”
To this he replied, “because until recently it lacked the necessary instrument,
the index number” (ibid ., p.113, italics in original)—an allusion (inter alia)
to the fact that the United States began publishing such numbers only in 1890
(see n. 1 above), and a nice example of Fisher’s concern with the relation
between theory and measurement. Correspondingly, he attributed the continued
resistance to his plan even after such numbers were available to conservatism,
to “resistance to change” (ibid., p. 237). In this context he added:
And now this obstacle of conservatism—the one great obstacle—has been
considerably lessened by the Great War, which has shaken the whole world out
of old ruts. Even Great Britain is considering giving up her ancient monetary
system—of pounds, shillings, and pence—in favor of a decimal coinage. (ibid.,
p. 239)
He was one “Great War” too early.
Second, in this book Fisher coined the term “money illusion” to denote
“the illusion that money is always ﬁxed in value,” and that it is only the prices
of goods that change (ibid., pp. 35–39; see also pp. xxxii–xxxiii). (Several years
later, he published a book with this title; see below.)
The third point is the dedication of Stabilizing the Dollar to “John Rooke,
Simon Newcomb, and Alfred Russel Wallace.” In another of its appendixes enti-
tled “Precedents,” under the rubric “Direct Anticipations,” Fisher lists Rooke as
the one who (in 1824) had ﬁrst published a proposal “substantially like that pro-
posed in this book,” and after him under that rubric lists Simon Newcomb (ibid.,
p. 293).17 What intrigues me, however, is the dedication to Wallace, by many
considered the joint discoverer with Charles Darwin of the theory of evolution.
17 Under this rubric, Fisher also lists Alfred Marshall, as well as three obscure American
and English writers of the 1890s. It was, of course, to Newcomb as an anticipator of the equation
of exchange that Fisher had also dedicated his Purchasing Power of Money (see p. 25, n. 2). In
his later book on Stable Money (1934b, pp. 26–28), Fisher presents a more detailed account of
Rooke’s proposal. Fisher lists Marshall on the basis of the second of two plans described in a
footnote in the latter’s 1887 article on “Remedies for Fluctuations of General Prices” (p. 206,
n. 2), which Fisher (1920, p. 294) describes as “in principle, virtually that of this book.” Note,
however, that as Fisher (ibid, p. 293) himself points out, Marshall states in that footnote that he
does not advocate either of the two plans. Note, too, the excerpt from an October 1912 letter
which Marshall wrote Fisher in which he expresses some reservations about the plan (reproduced
in Pigou, ed. 1925, pp. 477–78).       
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Wallace is listed in the aforementioned appendix under the rubric “Remote
Anticipations of the Plan to Stabilize the Dollar,” in the category of those who
advocated doing so by printing irredeemable paper money “regulated by an
index number of prices” (ibid., pp. 290–91). Thus in the 1898 paper to which
Fisher refers, Wallace explains that if the index should show a decline in prices,
the “Mint” would “issue fresh money,” and that
This money is sent to the Treasury and is at once brought into circulation by
being paid away in salaries, wages, purchase of materials, &c., in the various
Government departments ˙ ... On the other hand, when prices are rising, owing
to there being rather more money in circulation than is necessary, instructions
are sent to the Treasury to cancel a certain amount of the money paid in for
taxes, stamps, &c., till the balance is restored. (Wallace, 1898, p. 148).
In this appendix, Fisher (1920, p. 291) explains that the “essential difference”
between plans such as those of Wallace and his own “is that between re-
deemability and irredeemability.” But is there really an essential difference
between always being able to “redeem” a gold certiﬁcate for a possibly vary-
ing quantity of gold, on the one hand, and always being able to purchase with
irredeemable money a given quantity of gold at a possibly varying market price,
on the other?
So as an outsider to economics, Wallace was free from the attachment to
gold and thus advocated a stabilization policy that was more in the spirit of
the quantity theory. He was also explicit about what Fisher (in his deﬁnite-
reserve system) left unspeciﬁed; namely, the role of the Treasury in injecting or
withdrawing quantities of money from circulation. Here was a true anticipator
of the Chicago School of the 1930s. But what remains a puzzle for me is why
Fisher chose to dedicate the book to Wallace in preference to the well-known
economists he cited in the same category with him—among them Carl Menger
and Charles Gide (Fisher 1920, p. 291).18
Let me ﬁnally turn to that part of the book which in effect constituted a
most signiﬁcant turning point in Fisher’s campaign for the compensated dollar,
even if he did not at the time recognize it as such. I am referring to the last
clause in Fisher’s “Tentative Draft of an Act to Stabilize the Dollar” that also
appears in the book’s appendix on “Technical Details.” It reads:
The Federal Reserve Board could assist in the prompt and efﬁcient oper-
ation of the new system by having due regard to the rise and fall of the Index
Number, as suggested by Mr. Paul Warburg. This would help [by] its adjust-
ment of the rate of discount and its general loan policy to be such as to keep
the volume of individual deposits subject to check approximately proportional
both to bank reserves and to the Government gold reserve against gold bullion
dollar certiﬁcates. (ibid., p. 213)
18 It is interesting to note that Fisher had already referred to Wallace in his 1914 article (p.
818, n. 1).       
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Presumably, this clause represented Fisher’s response to those who criticized
his plan (including Warburg19) on the grounds that it dealt only with the cur-
rency component of the money supply. But Fisher failed to recognize that far
from strengthening the case for the compensated dollar, this clause actually
undermines it. For if success of the plan is dependent on the ability of the
Federal Reserve to control the volume of demand deposits, then one might as
well dispense with the plan and depend solely upon the Federal Reserve to
stabilize the price level directly by controlling the total money supply!
The high point in Irving Fisher’s protracted campaign for the compensated
dollar was reached when two years later the House Committee on Banking
and Currency held hearings on such an act (subsequently described by Fisher
[1934b, p. 152] as “practically in the form” of his aforementioned “Tentative
Draft”) which had been submitted by Congressman T. Alan Goldsborough
(the “First Goldsborough Bill”). Interestingly enough, this bill provided for a
modiﬁed version of Fisher’s deﬁnite-reserve system. In particular, it called for
maintaining a 50 percent gold reserve against gold certiﬁcates and stated that:
If on any date the reserve falls short of 50 per centum [as it would if the
price of gold were reduced—i.e., the gold content of the dollar increased—in
order to offset an increase in the price level] it is to be restored by withdrawing
from circulation and canceling gold bullion dollar certiﬁcates.
If on any date the reserve exceeds said 50 per centum it is to be restored
by issuing and putting into circulation the requisite number of new gold bullion
dollar certiﬁcates.
The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to make said withdrawals of
certiﬁcates from circulation by withdrawing from the Government deposits in
national banks and to issue certiﬁcates and place them in circulation by adding
to those deposits. (H.R. 11788, 1922, p. 3)
So the bill was more speciﬁc than Fisher had been in Stabilizing the Dollar
(see above) about the role of the Treasury in the case of the deﬁnite-reserve
system. But it too did not make explicit the implications of this system for
the Treasury’s budgetary deﬁcit or surplus. It should also be emphasized that
neither the bill nor Fisher’s “Tentative Draft” stipulated that the plan should
only be adopted as part of an international agreement.
Needless to say, the ﬁrst witness in the hearings on the bill was Fisher him-
self (1922, 1923a), who in his book-length testimony (which at times clearly
tried the patience of the committee) repeated much of what he had written on
the evils of an unstable dollar, the workings of the compensated dollar pro-
posal, and his arguments in favor of it—including (in a more egregious form)
his aforementioned misleading argument about Mexico.20 In his testimony, he
19 See Warburg (1920, pp. 702–3). Warburg was one of the ﬁve members of the original
(1914–18) Federal Reserve Board; see Barger (1964, pp. 50–51).
20 “The Mexican dollar now is half the value of ours. On the other side of us, across the         
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also stressed the importance of the cooperation of the Federal Reserve for the
success of the proposal, and explicitly referred in this context to the aforemen-
tioned last clause of the “Tentative Draft” of the bill that he had presented in
his Stabilizing the Dollar (Fisher 1922, p. 27; see also pp. 46–47).
Kemmerer (who as a result of his having repeatedly preached the virtues of
the gold exchange standard to the new countries that had been established after
World War I had become known as “the international money doctor”21) also
presented a statement to the Committee. Though agreeing with the importance
of stabilizing the price level, he pointed out that “how long a time would be
required for such changes in the size of the bullion dollar, working through the
money and deposit currency supply, to reduce the price level, say, 1 percent,
is a debatable question” (Kemmerer 1923, p. 158). And in the concluding
paragraphs of his statement he stated:
In the judgment of the writer any plan for stabilizing the monetary unit
to be successful should be international in its scope, including at least three or
four of the leading commercial nations and more if possible. For one country
to adopt the plan alone would throw its exchanges entirely out of adjustment
with those of gold-standard countries (and also of silver-standard countries),
and would give rise to all the evils of widely ﬂuctuating exchange rates. (ibid.,
p. 160)
Signiﬁcantly enough, in his summary many years later of the hearings on the
bill, Fisher (1934b, p. 155) said that Kemmerer “wrote (among other things) a
strong endorsement of the ‘Compensated Dollar’ plan,” and made no mention
whatsoever of the serious reservations that Kemmerer had expressed, which—in
view of the absence of any reference in the bill to an international agreement—
were tantamount to a recommendation to reject it.
5. THE DECLINE OF THE COMPENSATED DOLLAR
Neither the First Goldsborough Bill, nor the second (1924) slightly revised
version,22 was reported out of Committee. And with the increasing importance
of Federal Reserve monetary policy in the years which followed, Fisher slowly
came around to accepting the view that the objective of stabilizing the price
Canadian border, they have the same dollar as we have. Suppose Mexico ˙ .. would say ˙ .. ‘we are
going to have on this continent just one dollar of equal value in Canada, Mexico, and the United
States.’ Immediately prices in Mexico would be cut in two ˙ ... Is there any doubt about that?”
(Fisher 1922, pp. 23–24, italics added)
21 See Groseclose (1965), p. 141. See also Barber (1985), pp. 59–60, and his reference (ibid.,
p. 209, n. 48) to Kemmerer’s presidential address to the American Economic Association (1927),
in which the latter described the advice that he had given to many countries in connection with
the “establishment of the gold standard” (ibid., p. 4).
22 The revision consisted of the deletion of the clause that required a 50 percent reserve
against gold certiﬁcates. See H.R. 494, 68 Cong. 1 Sess., December 5, 1923.         
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level could be achieved by this policy alone, without the need for a compensated
dollar. Thus his 1928 The Money Illusion includes a discussion of the Federal
Reserve’s “duty to control or inﬂuence credit” by means of its open market
operations, as well as by the ﬁxing of its rediscount rates (ibid., pp. 131–35).
Though in this book Fisher again presented his compensated dollar proposal
(in its deﬁnite-reserve version), he concluded this presentation by saying:
When my Stabilizing the Dollar was written, I relegated credit control to
the Appendix, assuming that all banking, even central banking,23 would still
be conducted purely for private proﬁt. My aim was to make the whole plan
of stabilization—both gold control and credit control—as “automatic,” that is
as free from discretion, as possible.24
Since that time, however, as has been shown in this book, discretionary
credit control has actually come into existence. This, when duly perfected
and duly safeguarded, will greatly simplify and improve the technique of
stabilization and will make gold control secondary to credit control. (Money
Illusion, pp. 192–93)
Even though it includes The Money Illusion in its list of references, there
is no mention of “credit control,” and accordingly no indication of this shift
in emphasis, in the entry “Compensated Dollar” that Fisher wrote for the 1930
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. On the other hand, this shift is expressed
in an even more marked way in Fisher’s 1932 Booms and Depressions. The
roughly 20 percent decline in prices that had taken place in the preceding
two years had greatly increased the real burden of debt with a resulting wave
of bankruptcies, and had led Fisher to assign great importance to this factor
as a generator of depressions.25 Correspondingly, he stressed the desirabil-
ity of “reﬂating” the price level to its original level—and then stabilizing it
there. Chapter 10 of the 1932 book is accordingly devoted to a description of
“Remedies” to accomplish this subsequent stabilization. Most of this chapter
is devoted to the role that can be fulﬁlled by Federal Reserve monetary policy
in accomplishing this objective by effecting changes in the quantity of money
and hence on the price level. There is only a brief mention of the compensated
23 This is a most disingenuous statement for Fisher to have made: it is certainly not the view
that he expressed in the 1913 Hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
on the Federal Reserve Act (Fisher 1913e, pp. 1129–59). Nor does it accord with his description
of this act in his Stable Money (1934b, p. 148).
24 Another questionable aspect of Fisher’s discussion on these pages is his presentation of the
compensated dollar plan as being necessarily more “automatic” than a Federal Reserve monetary
policy that would also be based on the price index.
25 See also his “Debt-Deﬂation Theory of Great Depressions” (1933a). Note that in contrast
with his Purchasing Power of Money (1911, 1913)—in which a depression was explained as the
result of the fact that the price level was decreasing (see p. 4 above)—Fisher now emphasized
the role played by the fact that it was low. That is, his emphasis shifted from the rate of change
of prices to their absolute level. See Patinkin (1972, pp. 5–10). This aspect of Fisher’s analysis
of the depression has been much emphasized by Tobin (1985, p. 36b; 1987, p. 375b).    
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dollar plan, and even then not as the ﬁrst choice. In Fisher’s words:
A simple application of the compensated dollar plan would be to rely
principally upon credit control, and only at long intervals regulate the weight
of the dollar when other means proved inadequate. (ibid., p.139)
But Fisher does not explain why the compensated dollar plan would help in
cases where “credit control” proved “inadequate.”
Another signiﬁcant aspect of this chapter is that in it Fisher comes full
circle in the sense that (to the best of my knowledge) it is the ﬁrst time he
explicitly discussed stabilization policies within the analytical framework of
the equation of exchange that he had developed in his 1911 Purchasing Power
of Money. Similarly, he does so more explicitly than before in terms of the
quantity theory. And since (T given), the equation implies that P is affected by
V as well as by M, he also proposed a policy of inﬂuencing the price level by
what he called “velocity control” (Booms and Depression, pp. 140–1). This was
to be based on Silvio Gesell’s plan of issuing “stamped money,” which (Fisher
said) “would operate as a stamp tax on hoarding—increasing the velocity as
well as the quantity of money” (ibid., pp. 226–28). Fisher’s subsequent book
on After Reﬂation, What? (1933b) again assigns the major responsibility for
stabilizing the price level to Federal Reserve monetary policy, and again does
so within the analytical framework of the equation of exchange (ibid., Chap. 7;
Chap. 8 of the 1934 edition). Velocity control also earns brief mention (1933b,
pp. 95–98; 1934a, pp. 106–9). Fisher spelled out this last proposal in greater
detail in a book on Stamp Scrip that he also published in 1933.
So that is the anticlimactic denouement of the story of the compensated
dollar plan. I should however note that in After Reﬂation, What?, Fisher again
mentioned the compensated dollar plan as one that could be brought into oper-
ation if a “reasonable credit” policy would not be able to deal adequately with
great inﬂows or outﬂows of gold (1933b, pp. 93–95; 1934a, pp. 104–5). But
Fisher’s reference to this as a serious possibility was at variance with the en-
thusiastic description he had presented in his 1928 Money Illusion (pp. 131–35)
of how the open market sales of the Federal Reserve in 1922 had prevented the
monetary expansion and consequent inﬂation that otherwise would have taken
place as a result of its “huge gold reserves.” Furthermore, even if a central
bank in a gold-standard country should have to take additional steps in order to
deal with undesired gold movements, those steps are usually described as the
appreciation or depreciation of the exchange rate, and surely it is misleading
to describe them in terms of the compensated dollar plan.
In a section entitled “My Personal Views” in his book Stable Money
(1934b)—which in many ways can be regarded as Fisher’s concluding work
on the subject—he wrote:
As to the problem of stable money in the United States, while a rough
stabilization could be obtained by sole reliance on adjusting the price of gold       
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according to the compensated dollar plan, I do not think a really accurate
stabilization is feasible without also a direct control of the total volume of
checking deposits or what may be called checkbook money ˙ ... I would de-
pend for a stable dollar mainly on open market operations and occasional
adjustments of rediscount rates ˙ ... (ibid., pp. 396–97)
So even at the end Fisher could not bring himself to giving up his com-
pensated dollar plan entirely. Indeed, only in his 1935 100% Money—a book
which (as Fisher indicates in its preface [p. ix]) was much inﬂuenced by the
memoranda on this subject prepared by Henry Simons and his colleagues at
the University of Chicago—is there no mention whatsoever of the compensated
dollar plan. Here (once the 100 percent system was installed) stabilization of
the price level was to be achieved by open market operations and velocity
control alone (ibid., pp. 89–91). Fisher, however, might have felt that since
100 percent money would prevent sharp ﬂuctuations in the volume of demand
deposits and hence of the quantity of money, there would be no need for any
further action.
“On January 15, 1934, President Roosevelt sent a special message to
Congress, which was again a conﬁrmation of his intention of ‘˙ .. restoring the
price level, and, ˙ .. arriving eventually at a less variable purchasing power for
the dollar˙ ...’” (Stable Money, 1934b, p. 369, ellipses in original). That was
Fisher’s description of Roosevelt’s decision to devalue the dollar, a decision
that was put into effect at the end of that month, when Roosevelt raised the
price of gold from $20.67 to $35.00 an ounce. So the question naturally arises
as to the role that Fisher and his compensated dollar plan played in this decision
to (in his terms) decrease the gold content of the dollar. In his fascinating paper
on “Irving Fisher, F.D.R., and the Great Depression” (1977), William R. Allen
cites a letter that Fisher wrote Roosevelt in April 1933 in which he referred to
“the compensated dollar plan to which devaluation is the natural introduction”
(ibid., p. 570, n. 44). Allen also refers to letters that Fisher subsequently wrote
Roosevelt suggesting various levels to which the price of gold should be raised,
as well as a letter that Fisher wrote his wife in August 1933 reporting on a con-
versation that he had had with Roosevelt on the subject. Allen, however, adds
that “apparently, Fisher gave the President no hint of what ‘the compensated
dollar plan’ was” (ibid.).26
26 In this footnote, Allen also cites a letter that Fisher had written to President Hoover in
July 1931, in which Fisher had disingenuously written:
On thinking over our talk of Wednesday, I wonder if, when you expressed the fear that
stabilizing the purchasing power of money would change the basis of contracts, you
thought I was pleading for support by you of my old “Compensated Dollar Plan.” I
was not. It became evident long ago that immediate, practical progress lay along other
lines.         
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It would, however, appear that Fisher’s main inﬂuence on Roosevelt was
exerted at one remove by people who had accepted his policy view. This was
particularly true of George F. Warren, who was one of Roosevelt’s chief mon-
etary advisers in the last half of 1933 (Dorfman 1959, vol. 5, p. 581 n.). In
particular, Warren’s book with Frank A. Pearson on Prices (1933, pp. 163–
66, 168) provides a sympathetic account of the compensated dollar plan. This
situation was also reﬂected in the following passage from a letter that Fisher
wrote his son in February 1934:
˙ .. it was a “proud moment” when the President signed the devaluation bill.
I often wonder how much he realizes that his monetary policy goes back to
me in large part—through Warren and Rogers and Rand, as well as directly.
And the public doesn’t know it except here and there. But I take a lot of
satisfaction in the mere adoption of the policy of course. (emphasis in original
letter; cited by W.R. Allen 1977, p. 576, n. 67)
6. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In his posthumously published History of Economic Analysis (1954), Schum-
peter wrote that “some future historian may well consider Fisher as the greatest
of America’s scientiﬁc economists up to our own day” (ibid., p. 872). Simi-
larly, Samuelson (1967, p. 17) wrote that from the viewpoint of analytical
contributions, “Irving Fisher would emerge as perhaps the greatest single name
in the history of American economics.” I would, however, associate the com-
pensated dollar plan less with Fisher the scientiﬁc and analytical economist
(with his notable contributions to capital theory as well as monetary theory)
than with Fisher the possessor of two other character traits. The ﬁrst is Fisher
the gadgeteer. This trait manifested itself early in the form of the gadget that
he invented in 1884 at the age of 17 to improve the internal mechanism of the
piano—what was subsequently described in his son’s biography as “the ﬁrst of
a long line of brain-waves with which he bombarded the patent ofﬁce” (I.N.
Fisher 1956, p. 13).27 In his scientiﬁc writings, Fisher also made use of peda-
gogical gadgets: like the hydraulic mechanism which he depicted on p. 38 of
his 1892 doctoral dissertation on Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of
Value and Prices (and of which he actually constructed a model a year later28)
to illustrate the utility-maximizing conditions of general-equilibrium analysis.
Similarly, there were the diagrams in The Purchasing Power of Money (pp. 21,
27 For details of other inventions, see the page references listed under the entry “inventions”
in the index to this biography. See also the references listed under the entry “as inventor” on p.
317 of the index to R.L. Allen’s recent biography of Fisher (1993).
28 See its photograph, as well as that of the second model which he constructed in 1925, at
the beginning of the reprint of this dissertation as listed in the References below.         
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23) which explain the equation of exchange in terms of weights on the two
sides of a fulcrum; and the diagrams (on pp. 116–19 and 128) of the ﬂows of
gold into, between, and out of interconnected vessels which explain the relation
between these ﬂows, on the one hand, and the level of the monetary stock of
gold, on the other. Then, of course, there was the gadget which he invented
that in the 1920s made him a multi-millionaire; namely, the “visible card index
system” (I.N. Fisher 1956, pp. 160–3 et passim; R.L. Allen 1993, pp. 109–10,
136, 185–86). The compensated dollar plan was also in the nature of a gadget:
for in the eyes of its deviser, here was an automatic device which, by simply
changing one price in the economy, achieved the stabilization of the price level
in general.
The second of Fisher’s character traits with which I would associate his
plan was Fisher the inveterate crusader for different causes during his long life;
e.g., healthy living, world peace, and prohibition.29 In the zeal to advance his
cause, a crusader is less concerned than the scientist with the requirements of
objectivity, consistency, careful analysis of causal relations, and strict adherence
to rules of evidence. Fisher was no exception. Indeed, his recent biographer
has observed that
[Fisher’s] devotion to his multiple crusades was so complete that on occasion
he used all the tools of science he could muster to support them. He occa-
sionally bent a few facts and twisted logic slightly to make his case. When
this occurred, which was not common, it was rhetoric and likely entirely
unconscious on Fisher’s part. He was incapable of intended dishonesty or
deliberate deceit, but he was capable and occasionally guilty of self-delusion.
The conﬂict between his two roles, besides competition for time and energy,
was apparent only to others, not to Fisher. (R.L. Allen 1993, p. 6)
And on the basis of the foregoing account of the way in which Fisher repeatedly
evaded criticisms of his plan (particularly in its original form) and continued
over the years to support it by sometimes questionable arguments, I would cite
Fisher’s crusade for his compensated dollar plan as an example par excellence
of Allen’s general observation. At the same time, we should not overlook the
fact that Fisher’s persistent advocacy of this plan played a major role in placing
the problem of stabilizing the price level on the agenda of U.S. monetary policy
in the interwar period.
POSTSCRIPT
In the extensive literature on price stabilization that has developed since the
early 1980s, there are frequent references to Fisher’s compensated dollar plan,
29 See the biographies by I.N. Fisher (1956) and R.L. Allen (1993). It is also instructive
to see the large number of items dealing with these and similar subjects among the 2,500-odd
entries in the Bibliography of the Writings of Irving Fisher that was compiled by I.N. Fisher
(1961, 1972).      
26 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
and to his 1920 Stabilizing the Dollar in particular. But sometimes this name
is taken in vain. Thus Philip Cagan’s 1987 paper on “A Compensated Dollar:
Better or More Likely than Gold” suggests (inter alia) preserving the purchas-
ing power of money, not by stabilizing the price level, but by issuing indexed
money (i.e., money whose nominal value changes equiproportionately with the
price index), which would become “the primary medium of exchange” (ibid.,
p. 272). As I have, however, shown elsewhere (Patinkin 1993, pp. 122–24),
and as illustrated by the Israeli experience of the early 1980s, an economy
whose money supply is mostly indexed will generate a frictionless inﬂationary
process, which will accordingly continue indeﬁnitely at indeterminate rates.
In his article on “Explorations in the Gold Standard and Related Policies
for Stabilizing the Dollar,” Robert Hall (1982) has suggested stabilizing the
price level by modifying Fisher’s rule for achieving this objective by making
offsetting changes in the price of gold to making such changes in the price of
a ﬁxed basket of commodities, and thus (presumably by the operation of sub-
stitution effects) generating similar changes in the prices of other commodities.
The efﬁcacy of such effects for this purpose is itself doubtful. But quite apart
from that is the basic problem that arises from the fact that, in contrast with
Fisher’s proposal that the government buy and sell gold at the price that it
ﬁxes in order to make it effective, Hall emphasizes that the government should
not make purchases or sales of the basket of commodities used to deﬁne the
value of the dollar (ibid., pp. 120–21). But how else can the government make
effective its announced price for the basket? Surely, the announcement per se
will not do so. And surely we have had enough experience to demonstrate that
administrative price controls break down in the face of pressures created by
inﬂationary policies that generate increases in the money supply.30
On the other hand, Fischer Black’s proposal in his “A Gold Standard with
Double Feedback and Near Zero Reserves” (1981) can rightly be regarded as
a generalization of the modiﬁed version of Irving Fisher’s compensated dollar
proposal in its deﬁnite-reserve form that was incorporated in the First Golds-
borough Bill (see above, p. 19). In particular, whereas that bill required the
Secretary of the Treasury to take action after an offsetting change in the price
of gold in order to maintain a 50 percent gold reserve against gold certiﬁcates
in circulation, Fischer Black’s plan is a bit different. It leaves the monetary
authority free to ﬁx the reserve ratio between gold reserves and the quantity of
money in circulation at a level that it chooses and places the responsibility for
establishing and maintaining this ratio on open market operations that change
the quantity of money. (It also advocates ﬁxing this ratio as close as possible
to zero.) I should, however, point out that this afﬁnity with Fisher’s plan leaves
Fischer Black’s plan open to the same criticism leveled above (pp. 8–9 and
16) about the misleading nature of associating with the gold standard (whose
30 For a detailed critique of Hall’s proposal, see McCallum (1985, pp. 26–32).        
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hallmark is the ﬁxed exchange rate) a plan based on changes in the price of
gold and hence in the exchange rate.
I hope on some future occasion to deal at greater length with the issues
raised in the aforementioned literature.
A PERSONAL NOTE
In a paper some years ago, I expressed puzzlement that “in its policy dis-
cussions, the Chicago school of the 1930s and 1940s did not do justice to
Irving Fisher—despite the fact that long before the Chicago school, Fisher had
advocated the policy of stabilizing the price level as a means of mitigating—if
not avoiding—cyclical ﬂuctuations” (Patinkin 1973, p. 280).31 My work on the
present paper has suggested an answer to that puzzle. Because of his many
persistent crusades, as well as his also having persisted in losing a fortune in
the 1929 crash and its aftermath, Fisher had by the 1930s come to be regarded
as a crank, with his reputation as a scientist suffering accordingly (see Tobin
1987, pp. 370a and 371a–b, and Schumpeter 1954, p. 873; on his persistent
losses, see I.N. Fisher 1956, pp. 262–67). Furthermore, his name was still
associated with the outmoded compensated dollar plan, which for the Chicago
school (with its policy of stabilizing the price level by directly changing the
quantity of money through open market operations as well as by the generation
of budget deﬁcits) was simply an encumbrance. So in addition to the natural
process of the succession of generations, of the young taking over leadership
from the old, there was no reason for the Chicago school to have invoked
Fisher’s name in support of its program. Indeed, in view of his reputation at
the time, it would have been counterproductive for it to have done so. In brief,
by that time the Chicago school had become a leader on questions of monetary
policy, and Fisher a follower—as exempliﬁed by his acknowledgment to Henry
Simons and his colleagues in his 1935 book 100% Money. And perhaps that
too was a reason that in this book Fisher did not mention his compensated
dollar plan (see p. 23, above).
On one occasion in my life I had the privilege of meeting Irving Fisher
personally. It was at the January 1947 meetings of the Econometric Society in
Atlantic City, the ﬁrst scientiﬁc conference that I ever attended, at which I also
presented a paper. Fisher was chairman of my session, and I remember him as
a short, bearded, and wizened old man. Three months later he died at the age
of 80.
31 The emphasis is on “policy discussions”: for in both the undergraduate and graduate
courses on monetary theory that I attended at the University of Chicago in the early 1940s, Lloyd
Mints devoted much attention to Fisher’s transactions approach to the quantity theory. To the
best of my memory, he also had us read chapters from The Purchasing Power of Money. Fisher’s
equation of exchange also provided the theoretical framework for the policy proposals of the
Chicago school. On all this, see Patinkin (1969).      
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